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Abstract The present paper constructs a novel solution to the chopstick auction, and
thereby disproves a conjecture of Szentes and Rosenthal (Games and Economic Be-
havior, 2003a, 2003b). In contrast to the existing solution, the identied equilibrium
strategy allows a simple and intuitive characterization. Moreover, its best-response
set has the same Hausdor¤ dimension as its support, which may be seen as a robust-
ness property. The analysis also reveals some new links to the literature on Blotto
games.
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1. Introduction
Despite being one of the main mechanism for allocating multiple objects, simultane-
ous auctions are notorious for exposing bidders to the risk of ending up overpaying for
the combination of objects ultimately won.2 Much of the basic intuition is captured
by the example of the so-called rst-price chopstick auction (Szentes and Rosenthal,
2003a; see also Postlewaite and Wilson, 2003). In that auction, two bidders simulta-
neously place bids on three identical objects. Moreover, the value of winning at most
one object is zero, whereas the value of winning at least two objects is positive. For
the rst-price chopstick auction, Szentes and Rosenthal constructed a doubly sym-
metric mixed-strategy equilibrium, henceforth referred to as the Szentes-Rosenthal
equilibrium (SRE), in which bidders randomize uniformly over the surface of a tetra-
hedron.
The structure of the SRE is intriguing, in particular because it features a two-
dimensional equilibrium support encapsulating a three-dimensional best-response set.
As Szentes and Rosenthal (2003b) noted, however, their solution has two drawbacks.
First, the equilibrium strategy is surprisingly complicated. Second, given that the
best-response set has a higher dimension than the equilibrium support, it seems un-
likely that the SRE would be the result of a process that is aligned with some kind
of better or best-response dynamics.
The present paper documents the existence of a new type of equilibrium for the
chopstick auction. For ease of reference, this equilibrium will be referred to as the self-
similar equilibrium (SSE). To construct the SSE, a dynamic variant of the chopstick
auction is considered, which extends an approach used by Sion and Wolfe (1957).3
Intuitively, the reformulation fragments the bidders decision in the simultaneous
auction so that, at each stage of the dynamic auction, each object requires only a
2See Milgrom (2000). For real-life illustrations of such exposure risk see, e.g., van Damme (2000),
Ewerhart and Moldovanu (2005), and Ewerhart et al. (2012). Also the ndings of the experimen-
tal literature are consistent with the view that inexperienced subjects fall prey to exposure risk
(Englmaier et al. 2009; Mago and Sheremata, 2012).
3While Sion and Wolfe (1957) is more commonly known for providing an example of a two-person
zero-sum game without a value, later sections of that same paper describe a way to transcribe any
game on the square into a dynamic game of pursuit.
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choice between two options, which will be interpreted as either holding or raising the
respective bid. The equilibrium bid distribution of the SSE will then be characterized
as the measure-theoretic image of a simple stationary equilibrium in the dynamic
auction, where the stationarity property in the dynamic auction translates into a
self-similarity property in the simultaneous game.
Related literature. Fractal solutions to non-cooperative games of the Blotto
type have been identied by Gross and Wagner (1950) and Kvasov (2007). However,
neither of these papers considered the case of the chopstick auction.4 Gross (1954)
has constructed an example of a zero-sum game on the square with rational payo¤
functions and the Cantor distribution as the unique equilibrium.5 Related is also
the recent paper by Topolyan (2014) who uses the binary expansion of a uniformly
distributed random bid in order to construct an equilibrium in an all-pay contest with
additive contributions. Ok (2004) proves a xed-point theorem for correspondences
and applies it to rationalizability and to the theory of self-similar sets.
The remainder of the present paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes
the set-up. In Section 3, a dynamic variant of the chopstick auction is introduced, and
the SSE is constructed. A proof of the equilibrium property is provided in Section 4.
Section 5 deals with the dimension of the best-response set. In Section 6, the SSE is
characterized as a self-similar probability measure. Section 7 concludes.
2. Set-up
In the chopstick auction considered by Szentes and Rosenthal (2003a), a seller o¤ers
three identical objects, A, B, and C, via simultaneous sealed-bid auctions to a given
population of two bidders. Each of the two bidders i = 1; 2 submits a vector of bids,
X i = (X iA; X
i
B; X
i
C) 2 R3+: (1)
Moreover, for each object  2 fA;B;Cg, the bidder i  i 2 f1; 2g submitting the
highest bid on object  wins that object, and pays her bid X i to the seller, where
4The relationship to the literature on fractalsolutions will be discussed more thoroughly in a
separate section at the end of the present paper, where some new conjectures are formulated as well.
5See also Gross (1952) and Karlin (1959).
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ties are broken randomly, fairly, and independently across objects.6 The valuation of
any bidder i 2 f1; 2g of winning a total of qi 2 f0; 1; 2; 3g objects is
V (qi) =
(
0 if qi  1
2 if qi  2. (2)
I.e., a bidder has a valuation of zero if she wins at most one object, and a valuation
of two if she wins at least two objects. This specication of bidders valuations
corresponds to the so-called pure chopstick case discussed in Szentes and Rosenthal
(2003a, Ch. 2). Each bidder maximizes her expected payo¤, i.e., her valuation V (qi)
less the sum of her winning bids. The resulting game will be referred to as the
rst-price chopstick auction. If the bidder winning any object  (with  = A;B;C)
pays only the second-highest bid on that object, while all other rules of the game
remain unchanged, then the resulting game will be called the second-price chopstick
auction. Finally, if the bidders pay their bids unconditionally rather than conditional
on winning, then we will speak of the all-pay chopstick auction. The term chopstick
auction, i.e., without qualication, will be reserved for the rst-price format, however.
3. A dynamic variant of the chopstick auction
Modifying the set-up introduced in the previous section, it will be assumed now
that the bidding proceeds in stages, which extends the approach used by Sion and
Wolfe (1957, Sec. 3 and 4). Specically, at any stage t 2 N = f1; 2; :::g, each bidder
i 2 f1; 2g chooses, for each object  2 fA;B;Cg separately, whether to hold her
bid (xi(t) = 0) or to raise it (x
i
(t) = 1). Thus, at every stage t 2 N, each bidder
i 2 f1; 2g simultaneous and independently chooses a binary vector
xi(t) = (xiA(t); x
i
B(t); x
i
C(t)) (3)
from the set Dt = f0; 1g  f0; 1g  f0; 1g. Bidder i 2 f1; 2g wins object  2 f1; 2; 3g
against bidder j 6= i if and only if there is a stage T 2 N such that xi(t) = xj(t)
for all t < T , and xi(T) = 1 > 0 = x
j
(T). If such T < 1 does not exist, then
6The results of the present paper hold, however, for any tie-breaking rule.
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we will say that there is a tie on object . Thus, the allocation of the three objects
is determined either after nitely many stages at T  maxfTA; TB; TCg < 1, or
the bidding develops entirely in parallel on at least one object. The binary vector
xi(t) 2 Dt chosen by bidder i 2 f1; 2g at any stage t 2 N is assumed to remain
unobservable for bidder j 6= i at any later stage bt > t. By a (reduced-form) pure
strategy for bidder i 2 f1; 2g, we mean a sequence xi = fxi(t)g1t=1 consisting of
choices xi(t) 2 Dt for all t 2 N. Alternatively, a pure strategy may be written as a
vector xi = (xiA; x
i
B; x
i
C), where x
i
 = fxi(t)g1t=1 is a binary sequence for each object
 2 fA;B;Cg. The set of pure strategies will be denoted by D = Q1t=1Dt. Payo¤s
in the dynamic game are derived from the simultaneous rst-price chopstick auction,
where bidder is bid X i on object  2 fA;B;Cg is replaced by the convergent series
(xi) =
1X
t=1
xi(t)
2t
2 [0; 1]. (4)
Thus, the binary choices made by a bidder for an object in the course of the dynamic
bidding process are taken as digits in a dyadic expansion of the corresponding bid in
the simultaneous auction. The thereby dened innite-horizon game will be referred
to as the dynamic (rst-price) chopstick auction. It should be noted that the mapping
 is continuous, so that the payo¤ functions in the dynamic game are measurable.
Next, we dene two mixed extensions of the dynamic chopstick auction, following
essentially Kuhn (1953).7 Amixed strategy in the dynamic chopstick auction is a prob-
ability measure on D, where the -eld of Borel sets on D is derived from the product
of the discrete topologies on each factor Dt.8 Expected payo¤s resulting from a pair
of mixed strategies are dened as usual in terms of the bilinear extension of the payo¤
function. This extension is well-dened because payo¤s are bounded. Moreover, by
the substitution rule (Kallenberg, 1997, Lemma 1.22), expected payo¤s may be deter-
mined equivalently by considering the image measures of both mixed strategies and
7While Kuhns (1953) original work is restricted to nite games, an extension to games with
innite play length has been accomplished in unpublished work by P. Wolfe (cf. Aumann, 1964).
8Since each Dt is a separable metric space, the Borel -eld on D corresponds precisely to the
measure-theoretic product of the Borel -elds on each Dt. See Kallenberg (1997, Lemma 1.2).
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calculating expectations in the simultaneous auction. A (path-independent) behav-
ior strategy  = f(t)g1t=1 in the dynamic chopstick auction species an independent
probability distribution over the nite choice set Dt at each stage t 2 N. By taking
the product measure over the component distributions of a given behavior strategy
, we obtain a unique mixed strategy in the dynamic chopstick auction, which will be
denoted as e. In particular, expected payo¤s resulting, say, from a pair of behavior
strategies are well-dened. A behavior strategy  is a symmetric Nash equilibrium
if the associated mixed strategy e maximizes any bidder is expected payo¤s, within
the set of all mixed strategies, under the condition that bidder is opponent j 6= i
adheres to e.
A specic behavior strategy SSE in the dynamic chopstick auction is dened by the
requirement that, at each stage t 2 N, the bidder samples her choices independently
and according to the following probability law:
State !(t) !0 !1 !2 !3
Probability pr(!(t)) 1=4 1=4 1=4 1=4
Binary vector x(t) (0; 0; 0) (0; 1; 1) (1; 0; 1) (1; 1; 0)
(5)
Thus, adhering to SSE means that, at each stage, the bidder in question either holds
her bids on all three objects, or raises her bids on precisely two randomly selected
objects. Moreover, each of these altogether four possibilities are selected with equal
probability, and independently across stages.
The following observation is key to most of the results of the present paper.
Lemma 1. SSE is a symmetric Nash equilibrium in the dynamic chopstick auction.
A proof will be provided in the next section. Lemma 1 is useful because it allows to
construct a new type of equilibrium in the simultaneous chopstick auction. To see
this, start from the mixed strategy eSSE induced by the behavior strategy SSE. Note
next that any pure strategy x = (xA; xB; xC) 2 D in the dynamic chopstick auction
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may be transformed, by component-wise application of the mapping , into to a bid
vector
X = (XA; XB; XC) = ((xA); (xB); (xC)) 2 [0; 1]3 (6)
in the simultaneous auction. Since this transformation is continuous, the measure-
theoretic image of the mixed strategy eSSE under the transformation is a well-dened
mixed strategy SSE in the simultaneous auction. Moreover, as stated in the following
proposition, the image distribution inherits the equilibrium property from SSE.
Proposition 1. SSE is a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in the simul-
taneous rst-prize chopstick auction.
Proof. Suppose that both bidders adhere to SSE in the simultaneous chopstick
auction. To prove that SSE is an equilibrium, it su¢ ces to show that there is no pure
strategy X 2 R3+ that outperforms the mixed strategy SSE. Indeed, if any pure-
strategy deviation yields a weakly negative expected payo¤, then the same is true for
any mixed-strategy deviation because of the monotonicity of the Lebesgue integral.
Let, therefore, X = (XA; XB; XC) 2 R3+ be an arbitrary pure-strategy deviation in
the simultaneous chopstick auction. Then, bidding more than unity on any object
 2 fA;B;Cg is weakly dominated, because the bid X = 1 wins object  against
SSE with probability one. One may therefore, without loss of generality, focus on the
case of pure-strategy deviations (XA; XB; XC) 2 [0; 1]3, i.e., such that all three bids
are chosen from the unit interval. But since the component-wise application of the
mapping  is surjective on [0; 1]3 and leaves, by construction of the dynamic auction,
payo¤s invariant, the assertion follows now directly from Lemma 1. 
Szentes and Rosenthal (2003b, p. 293) conjectured that the SRE is unique within the
class of symmetric equilibria of the chopstick auction. Proposition 1 above shows that
this is not the case. Instead, the chopstick auction admits at least one alternative
symmetric solution, viz. the SSE. With the help of additional arguments that will be
detailed elsewhere, one can even show that any convex combination of the SSE and
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the SRE is again a symmetric equilibrium. However, as will be explained in Section 6,
there is no easy way to assemble additional equilibria in the chopstick auction using
the established replacement techniques known from the literature on the Blotto game.
The remainder of this section discusses some immediate properties of the SSE.
Denote by F (XA; XB; XC) the probability that SSE is component-wise weakly smaller
than (XA; XB; XC) 2 R3+. Thus, F is the distribution function of SSE. Then, any
bivariate marginal distribution of F , i.e., the distribution of bids on any xed pair of
objects, is uniform. For example, when integrating out the last component,
F (XA; XB; 1) = XAXB, (7)
as follows directly from considering the projection of the probability law (5) on the
rst two coordinates. However, except on the equilibrium support, there is no simple
algebraic expression for F (XA; XB; XC).
The expected payo¤ from playing SSE against itself is zero. Indeed, by symmetry,
each bidder wins two or more objects with probability 1
2
, and therefore has an expected
valuation of the outcome of 1
2
 2 = 1. Moreover, each bidder wins a given object with
probability 1
2
, and the winning bid is distributed like the maximum of two independent
uniform distributions on the unit interval, i.e., with mean 2
3
, so that the expected
payment for each bidder is 3  1
2
 2
3
= 1. It follows that the expected payo¤ from the
symmetric equilibrium SSE is indeed zero. Thus, biddersrents are entirely extracted
not only in the SRE, but also in the SSE.
If all bid realizations in the mixed-strategy equilibrium SSE are doubled, one
obtains an equilibrium of the second-prize chopstick auction. This is so because, in a
second-price auction with uniform bids, the losing bid is on average half the winning
bid (cf. Szentes and Rosenthal, 2003a). Similarly, an equilibrium of the all-pay variant
of the chopstick auction can be constructed by squaring all bids in SSE. This is a
consequence of more general results of Szentes (2005), which have been made quite
explicit for this particular case by Kovenock and Roberson (2012).
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4. Proof of Lemma 1
The idea of the proof is it to exploit the stationarity of the behavior strategy SSE as
much as possible.
We start by deriving an explicit expression for the bidders expected payo¤ from
playing an arbitrary pure strategy x 2 D against the behavior strategy SSE in the
dynamic chopstick auction. Given two pure strategies x = fx(t)g1t=1 2 D and bx =
fbx(t)g1t=1 2 D in the dynamic chopstick auction, we shall say that x weakly wins all
the objects against bx, in short x  bx, if for all three objects v = A;B;C, the bid
x = fx(t)g1t=1 either wins or ties against bx = fbx(t)g1t=1. We may then dene,
for the behavior strategy SSE in the dynamic chopstick auction, its distribution
function
(x) = pr(SSE  x). (8)
Then, noting that ties occur with probability zero, a bidders expected payo¤ from
playing the pure strategy x = (xA; xB; xC) 2 D against the behavior strategy SSE
may be expressed as
(x) = 2f(xA; xB; 1) + (xA; 1; xC) + (1; xB; xC)  2(x)g (9)
  (xA)(xA; 1; 1)  (xB)(1; xB; 1)  (xC)(1; 1; xC).
Exploiting further the fact that all bivariate marginals of  are products of indepen-
dent uniform distributions, as discussed in the previous section, equation (9) may be
written alternatively as
(x) = 2(xA)(xB) + 2(xA)(xC) + 2(xB)(xC) (10)
  (xA)2   (xB)2   (xC)2   4(x).
This is the desired explicit expression for a bidders expected payo¤ resulting from a
pure-strategy deviation x 2 D in the dynamic chopstick auction.
Next, to exploit the stationarity of the behavior strategy SSE, we note that any
given pure strategy x = fx(t)g1t=1 2 D in the dynamic chopstick auction may be
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decomposed into a rst-stage choice
x(1) 2 D1 = f0; 1g  f0; 1g  f0; 1g, (11)
and a shifted pure strategy
x+ = fx+(t)g1t=1 = fx(t+ 1)g1t=1 2 D: (12)
This decomposition, which can analogously be accomplished for the bid on an indi-
vidual object, proves very useful for all what follows. For instance, one can readily
check that the mapping  satises the recursive relationship
(x) =
x(1) + (x
+
 )
2
, (13)
for any object  2 fA;B;Cg and for any pure strategy x 2 D.
Simple recursive relationships can be derived now for the function  = (x),
which will enable us to evaluate the sign of (x). The following lemma states those
relationships, where the symmetry of the behavior strategy SSE across objects allows
to restrict attention to a subset of values for the rst-stage choice x(1).
Lemma 2. For any pure strategy x 2 D in the dynamic chopstick auction,
(x) =
1
4

8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
(x+) if x(1) = (0; 0; 0)
(x+A)(x
+
B) if x(1) = (0; 0; 1)
(x+A) + (x
+) if x(1) = (0; 1; 1)
1 + (x+A)(x
+
B) + (x
+
A)(x
+
C) + (x
+
B)(x
+
C) if x(1) = (1; 1; 1).
(14)
Proof. Let x 2 D be an arbitrary pure strategy in the dynamic chopstick auction.
As explained above, we may decompose x into a rst-stage choice x(1) 2 D1 and a
shifted pure strategy x+ 2 D. The four cases in equation (14) are now dealt with one
at a time:
Case 1. Suppose rst that the rst-period choice prescribed by the pure strategy x
is x(1) = (0; 0; 0). Intuitively, strategy x speculates on !(1) realizing to !0, because
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in all other cases, it becomes impossible to weakly win all three objects. Put more
formally, x weakly wins all the objects against a specic realization bx 2 D of the
behavior strategy SSE if and only if the following two conditions hold: (i) the rst-
period choice prescribed by the realized pure strategy bx is bx(1) = (0; 0; 0), and (ii)
the shifted strategy x+ weakly wins all objects against the shifted realization
bx+ = fbx+(t)g1t=1 = fbx(t+ 1)g1t=1 2 D: (15)
But, by denition, the behavior strategy SSE is stationary, i.e., its realizations bx =
fbx(t)g1t=1 2 D are distributed independently across stages. Therefore, the shifted
realization bx+ follows the same stochastic distribution as bx, viz. SSE. Moreover,
the shifted realizations bx+ are distributed independently from the rst-period choicebx(1) prescribed by the realized pure strategy bx. Hence, noting that bx(1) follows the
distribution (5), we arrive at (x) = 1
4
 (x+), as claimed.
Case 2. Next, suppose that the rst-period choice prescribed by the pure strategy x
is x(1) = (0; 0; 1). This case is similar to the previous one insofar that strategy x loses
the possibility to win all three objects unless !(1) realizes to !0. But, in contrast to
the previous case, if indeed !(1) = !0, then strategy x has already won object C in
stage t = 1, so that the allocation remains undetermined only for objects A and B.
Hence, in this case, x weakly wins all three objects against a specic pure-strategy
realization bx 2 D from the distribution SSE if and only if the following two conditions
hold: (i) the rst-stage choice prescribed by bx satises bx(1) = (0; 0; 0), and (ii) the
shifted realization bx+ satises bx+  (x+A; x+B; 1). Exploiting again the stationarity of
SSE, it follows that
(x) =
1
4
 (x+A; x+B; 1) =
(x+A)(x
+
B)
4
. (16)
Case 3. Suppose now that x(1) = (0; 1; 1). Then, following the same reasoning as
above, it can be checked that strategy x weakly wins all the objects against a specic
realization bx 2 D of the behavior strategy SSE if either (i) !(1) = !0 and bx+ 
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(x+A; 1; 1), or (ii) !(1) = !1 and bx+  x+. Hence,
(x) =
1
4
 (x+A) +
1
4
 (x+), (17)
as claimed.
Case 4. Finally, suppose that x(1) = (1; 1; 1). In this case, it is obvious that strategy
x weakly wins all the objects against a specic realization bx 2 D of the behavior
strategy SSE if !(1) = !0. But strategy x likewise weakly wins all the objects if
either (i) !(1) = !1 and bx+  (1; x+B; x+C), or (ii) !(1) = !2 and bx+  (x+A; 1; x+C), or
(iii) !(1) = !3 and bx+  (x+A; x+B; 1). The assertion follows now as before.
Since all cases have been covered, this proves relationship (14). 
Next, returning to the proof of Lemma 1, it is shown that there are no protable
deviations. As shown in the previous section, the expected payo¤ of SSE against
itself is zero. Hence, a protable deviation must yield a strictly positive expected
payo¤. One can check that the dynamic chopstick auction is not continuous at innity
(Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, p. 110), so that the one-stage deviation principle cannot
be invoked. Fortunately, however, the arguments remain manageable because of the
stationarity of SSE. The following cases need to be considered.
Case A. Suppose rst that a pure strategy x 2 D exists such that
x(1) 2 S1  f(0; 0; 0); (0; 1; 1); (1; 0; 1); (0; 1; 1)g, (18)
and such that (x) > 0. Thus, intuitively, there is a protable deviation that
does not start right away, but only at a later stage. Then, in any of these cases,
a straightforward calculation using Lemma 2 as well as equations (10) and (13) de-
livers (x) = 1
4
 (x+). For example, if x(1) = (0; 1; 1), then
(x) =
(x+A)(1 + (x
+
B))
2
+
(x+A)(1 + (x
+
C))
2
+
(1 + (x+B))(1 + (x
+
C))
2
(19)
  (x
+
A)
2
4
  (1 + (x
+
B))
2
4
  (1 + (x
+
C))
2
4
  (x+A)  (x+).
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Collecting terms, we nd that, indeed,
(x) =
(x+A)(x
+
B)
2
+
(x+A)(x
+
C)
2
+
(x+B)(x
+
C)
2
(20)
  (x
+
A)
2
4
  (x
+
B)
2
4
  (x
+
C)
2
4
  (x+)
=
1
4
 (x+). (21)
The other cases are similar. Thus, even though there is no discounting, delaying a
protable deviation would only lower expected payo¤s. Conversely, this shows that
the deviation x+ 2 D, if used from stage t = 1 onwards, would magnify the strictly
positive expected payo¤ from strategy x by the factor 4. Iterating this argument,
if necessary, and using the fact that expected payo¤s in the chopstick auction are
bounded, we nd after nitely many applications of the shift operator that there
necessarily exists also a protable pure-strategy deviation bx 2 D that does not satisfy
(18). Thus, it su¢ ces to consider the remaining cases.
Case B. Suppose next that
x(1) 2 f(1; 0; 0); (0; 1; 0); (0; 0; 1)g: (22)
By renaming the objects, if necessary, one may assume without loss of generality that
x(1) = (0; 0; 1). But then, using equations (10) and (13), as well as Lemma 2, one
obtains
(x) =
(x+A)(x
+
B)
2
+
(x+A)(1 + (x
+
C))
2
+
(x+B)(1 + (x
+
C))
2
(23)
  (x
+
A)
2
4
  (x
+
B)
2
4
 
 
1 + (x+C)
2
4
  (x+A)(x+B)
= ( 1
4
)  ((x+A) + (x+B)  (x+C)  1)2 (24)
 0. (25)
Thus, there is no protable deviation x satisfying (22).9
9However, here and below, there are obvious indi¤erence relationships, which will matter in the
determination of the best-response set. See Section 5.
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Case C. Finally, consider the case where
x(1) = (1; 1; 1). (26)
In this case, one again makes use of equations (10) and (13) as well as of Lemma 2,
and nds
(x) =
(1 + (x+A))(1 + (x
+
B))
2
(27)
+
(1 + (x+A))(1 + (x
+
C))
2
+
(1 + (x+B))(1 + (x
+
C))
2
  (1 + (x
+
A))
2
4
  (1 + (x
+
B))
2
4
  (1 + (x
+
C))
2
4
  1  (x+A)(x+B)  (x+A)(x+C)  (x+B)(x+C).
Rearranging yields
(x) = ( 1
4
)  ((x+A) + (x+B) + (x+C)  1)2  0. (28)
Hence, it is weakly suboptimal to use a pure strategy x 2 D satisfying (26) against
SSE.
Since there is no protable pure-strategy deviation, the behavior strategy SSE is a
symmetric equilibrium in the dynamic chopstick auction. This completes the proof
of Lemma 1.
5. Analysis of the best-response set
This section discusses issues related to the dimensionality of the SSE. More precisely,
we will follow Szentes and Rosenthal (2003a) in comparing the respective dimensions
of the equilibrium support and the best-response set. For the SRE, the equilib-
rium support has dimension 2, which is strictly smaller than the dimension of the
corresponding best-response set, which is 3. To deal with the SSE, obviously, the
traditional denition of dimensionality in terms of degrees of freedom, which is very
13
suitable for smooth objects such as simplices and manifolds, needs to be extended.
Below, we shall therefore make use of a more general notion of dimensionality.
We rst recall the notion of the Hausdor¤ dimension.10. Given a bounded subset
S  RL, with L  1, and some nonnegative real number d  0, the d-dimensional
Hausdor¤ content of S is dened as the inmum of the set of numbers   0 such
that there exist sequences fzng1n=1 in RL and frng1n=1 in R++ such that (i) for any
z 2 S, there is some index n such that jz   znj  rn, and (ii)
P1
n=1 r
d
n < . The
Hausdor¤ dimension of S, denoted by dimH(S), is the inmum of all d for which the
d-dimensional Hausdor¤ content of S is zero.
Let S denote the support of the equilibrium bid distribution SSE. One can con-
vince oneself that the set S consists precisely of those bid vectorsX = (XA; XB; XC) 2
R3+ that are contained in the component-wise image of the support of eSSE under the
mapping .11 Thus, the set S is the popular self-similar structure known as the
Sierpinski tetrahedron. Rather than o¤ering a formal description, we will provide a
geometric description of S. The Sierpinski tetrahedron may be constructed from its
solid counterpart by rst carving out a regular octahedron (see Figure 1), then re-
peating that task on each of the resulting four smaller tetrahedra, and nally iterating
this step at innitum.
The set S is compact and of the same cardinality as the unit cube [0; 1]3, but its
Lebesgue measure is zero, and it is not dense in any non-degenerate interval. The
Hausdor¤ dimension of the Sierpinski tetrahedron S is
dimH(S
) =
ln 4
ln 2
= 2, (29)
as follows from standard results on the dimensionality of self-similar sets (see, e.g.,
Falconer, 2014, Theorem 9.3; cf. also Kvasov, 2007). Since the Sierpinski tetrahedron
10According to Falconer (2014), the Hausdor¤ dimension is the oldest and probably most impor-
tant notion of fractal dimension. This notion is also consistent with the dimensionality notion used
by Kvasov (2007, caption of Figure 2).
11Indeed, the support of eSSE is compact by Tychono¤s theorem and, hence, its continuous image
S  [0; 1]3 under the component-wise application of the mapping  is likewise compact. It follows
that S is closed and of measure one, so that S  S. Conversely, the pre-image of any non-empty
set relative open in S is non-empty and relative open in the support of eSSE , and consequently has
positive measure under eSSE . Hence, S  S, which implies S = S.
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contains its four outer vertices, the convex hull of S is just the solid tetrahedron-
shaped best-response set considered by Szentes and Rosenthal (2003a).
Figure 1
We can show now the following:
Proposition 2. In the simultaneous chopstick auction, the set of pure best responses
to SSE has Hausdor¤ dimension two.
Proof. As seen in Section 4, a pure best response x 2 D to SSE in the dynamic
chopstick auction is either a pure strategy in the support of SSE, or a nite sequence
in the set
S1 = f(0; 0; 0); (0; 1; 1); (1; 0; 1); (0; 1; 1)g, (30)
followed by a pure strategy bx 2 D such that either, up to a renaming of objects,bx(1) = (0; 0; 1) and
(bx+A) + (bx+B)  (bx+C)  1 = 0, (31)
or bx(1) = (1; 1; 1) and
(bx+A) + (bx+B) + (bx+C)  1 = 0: (32)
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In the former case, relationship (13) implies
(bxA) = (bx+A)
2
, (bxB) = (bx+B)
2
, and (bxC) = 1 + (bx+C)
2
, (33)
so that equation (31) becomes equivalent to
(bxA) + (bxB) = (bxC), (34)
where (bxC)  12 . In the latter case,
(bxA) = 1 + (bx+A)
2
, (bxB) = 1 + (bx+B)
2
, and (bxC) = 1 + (bx+C)
2
, (35)
so that equation (32) is equivalent to
(bxA) + (bxB) + (bxC) = 2, (36)
where
(bxA)  1
2
, (bxB)  1
2
, and (bxC)  1
2
: (37)
Moreover, the best-response set in the simultaneous chopstick auction is the image
under the component-wise application of the mapping  of the best-response set in
the dynamic auction. Thus, invoking some geometric intuition, the best-response set
of the SSE may be thought of as adding to the equilibrium support the four faces of
each of the tetrahedra considered during the iterative construction of the Sierpinski
tetrahedron. The set of best responses to SSE is, therefore, the denumerable union
of two-dimensional sets, and as such, two-dimensional. 
Thus, in contrast to the SRE, the best-response set of the SSE is indeed of the same
dimension as its equilibrium support. Still, it is hard to tell in the abstract if this
property makes it more likely that a process favoring better or best responses would
lead to the SSE rather than to the SRE.12
12However, the robustness of the SSE is supported by ongoing research on the numerical compu-
tation of the equilibrium.
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6. Relationship to the literature on fractalsolutions
In this section, it will be shown that the SSE may be characterized as a measure
invariant under a simple replacement operation. This way, we can also explain how
the SSE relates to fractalsolutions considered in prior work on the Blotto game.
Consider the following four contraction mappings on the unit cube [0; 1]3:
C0(X) =
1
2
X (38)
C1(X) =
1
2
fX + (0; 1; 1)g (39)
C2(X) =
1
2
fX + (1; 0; 1)g (40)
C3(X) =
1
2
fX + (1; 1; 0)g (41)
Then, by construction, SSE is an invariant measure (Hutchinson, 1981) with respect
to the above family of contractions fCkg4k=1. In other words, the probability dis-
tribution SSE is identical to the equally-weighted convex combination of the four
image measures of SSE with respect to the contractions (38)-(41). This property can
actually be used to characterize the SSE.
Proposition 3. The probability distribution SSE is characterized by the property
that it is invariant with respect to the family of contractions fCkg4k=1.
Proof. The claim follows immediately from the fact that the invariant measure is
unique (Hutchinson, 1981, Sec. 4). 
The relationship to existing work on fractalsolutions will be discussed now. Gross
and Wagner (1950) constructed new classes of equilibria of Colonel Blotto games by
replacing a given hexagon in the hexagonal solution by a convex combination of six
smaller replicas. Iterating this replacement operation a nite number of times, ab-
solutely continuous bid distributions of arbitrary geometric complexity (the so-called
snowake solutions) have be constructed. The main purpose of such constructions
was it, however, to show that solutions exist with a support that has a Lebesgue
measure smaller than any given " > 0. It was also noted that the respective smallest
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building blocks in this construction, obtained after a nite number of operations, can
be replaced by suitably demagnied disk solutions.13
More recently, the same approach of iteratively deriving new equilibria from exist-
ing ones has been used by Kvasov (2007) to construct fractalsolutions to Colonel
Blotto games with costly resources. Thereby, it has been shown that, similarly, solu-
tions of Blotto games with costly resources exist the support of which has a Lebesgue
measure smaller than any given " > 0. The family of contractions (38)-(41) considered
above for the chopstick auction is obviously a variant of the Gross-Wagner-Kvasov
replacement operation for Blotto games.
However, it remains an open question whether a nite iteration of applying the
replacement operation (38)-(41) to the SRE would similarly lead to new classes of
equilibria in the chopstick auction. Indeed, while the equilibrium property in a Blotto
game may be veried quite easily by checking that univariate marginals are uniform
(Roberson, 2006), no such simple test is available in the case of the chopstick auction.
Instead, geometric considerations of substantial complexity would be needed.14 In
particular, the results of the present paper do not easily follow from existing work.15
7. Conclusion
A new type of equilibrium has been identied for an important prototype model of the
simultaneous auction, the so-called chopstick auction. A somewhat unusual aspect
of the equilibrium bid distribution is that it may be characterized as a self-similar
probability measure. Even though similar fractalsolutions have been constructed
before in the class of Blotto games and in games with rational payo¤ functions, this
13In fact, it is not hard to convince oneself that any equilibrium of the Blotto game, including
those recently identied by Weinstein (2012), may be used as smallest-scale replacements in this
sort of construction.
14Even using the methods developed in the present paper, the question is not be easy to answer.
The reason is that, if the SRE is translated back into a behavior strategy in the dynamic auction
using Kuhns construction, it turns out to be not only non-stationary, but also path-dependent. This
makes it quite di¢ cult to decide the Nash property for candidate equilibria that are derived from
the SRE through nite iterations of the replacement operation.
15Conversely, however, it is possible to construct entirely new equilibria in Blotto games using the
methods developed in the present paper. See the Conclusion.
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possibility was (to the authors knowledge) not a well-known feature of the class of
simultaneous auctions. The observation must, therefore, be added, to the collection
of perplexing properties of this interesting class of auctions.
It is tempting to repudiate any fractalsolution on the grounds that it is too com-
plicated. The analysis above has shown that this conclusion might be unwarranted.
After all, using the dynamic transcription of the simultaneous auction, the self-similar
equilibrium constructed in the body of the present paper may be described in simple
and intuitive terms. Moreover, there is some evidence (work in progress) that the
theoretical robustness property established in the present paper actually matters for
numerical computations of the equilibrium strategy, which is also consistent with the
prediction of Szentes and Rosenthal (2003b). Thus, the self-similar equilibrium may,
paradoxically perhaps, be thought of as being both simpler and more robust than the
known solution.
There are large classes of games in political economy, including in particular the
interesting class of majority auctions, that may be seen as direct generalizations of
the two-bidder three-object auction and for which, in some important special cases,
essentially nothing is known about the equilibrium set (cf. Szentes and Rosenthal,
2003b). Unfortunately, a direct extension of the methods developed in the present
paper is not fruitful. For example, in a majority auction with ve objects, raising
the bids dynamically on a randomly selected subset of, say, three objects does not
constitute an equilibrium. Therefore, more rened methods are necessary to construct
equilibria in those games. A more or less obvious case in which the methods developed
in the present paper can actually be used to construct new and interesting equilibria is
the class of continuous Colonel Blotto and General Lotto games. However, elaborating
further on this extension would go beyond the scope of the present paper. We hope
to be able to document these ndings more explicitly in future research.
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